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HEDGING STRATEGIES UTILIZING TECHNICAL ANALYSIS: 
AN APPLICATION TO CORN IN WESTERN NEW YORK
S. F. Querin and W. G. Tomek
Hedging production decisions, using futures contracts can reduce the 
variability of a farmer's stream of income over a period of years, but the 
^ c i s e  effect of hedging on the variability
in part, on the particular hedging strategy which the farmer folio • 
Strategies require decisions about such factors as the timing of the place 
ment^nd lifting of futures positions and the size of p o s e
Naturally, farmers would like to find a strategy for hedging that raises
incomes and reduces variability of incomes.
This publication is concerned mainly with the timing decisions related 
to the placing and lifting of h e d g e s  by corn growers in Western New York 
(for a general discussion, see Tomek). 1/ Simple rules are (a) to never 
hedge or (b) to always hedge, say, by always selling u ures • , ,
time In practice, most farmers never hedge. A middle groun 8
"Actively!" but this raises the question of what rule or principle should
he followed in deciding when and when not to hedge. One e
sell futures only when the hedge appears to assur« ‘sP^vel toother
over costs, but of course prices may never reach this lev . _
approach is to try to sell futures when prices are relatively h gh • -
not sell on an uptrend and then attempt to sell near the top of the
Brokerage firms have often suggested technical ‘ ° ^ n
tifving trends in prices, and with the increased availability of modern 
calculators and personal computers, technical analysis is certainly a
feas ible approach to decis ion-making. _2/
In this context, our main objective is to explain and
application of t e c h n i c . ^ ^ ^ “J e n e r a r u ^ o f t e c h J c a l  analysis is 
for hedging decisions. Firs , g illustrated Then, various
hedging6^trategies'are rilcuLfd^inaudLs those based on technical trading
The reference1/ Citations to the literature are made by author’s name.
"■ section provides a list of these publications.
2/ Technical analysis is only one way that one mlf 't a L l y S s ^ T h i s- relatively high prices. A second approach is fundamental analysis, ini
Tpproalh "attempts to estimate the prices one might
supply and demand ^discussion of fundamentalpected, then this would be a sell signal.
analysis is beyond the scope of this report. ______ __________ ■____
W.
Tauer^eviewed'a^draft of'hh'pubUcation. We gratefully acknowledge their
assistance.
2rules3 and selected strategies are simulated using cash prices for corn 
for grain in Western New York and Chicago futures prices. In addition, 
hypothetical, but realistic, futures price data are replicated over a 
large number of years to illustrate the possible benefits and problems 
of technical analysis in greater detail than permitted by the available 
price data. A final major section interprets the results, which do not 
lend themselves to a simple "golden rule." Basically, technical analysis 
is a tool which may assist hedging decisions, but the value of technical 
analysis can be exaggerated, especially by those who have a vested in­
terest in selling such systems.
Technical Analysis of Futures Prices
Technical analysis involves techniques that rely on past prices (some­
times supplemented with volume of trading aid open interest data) to forecast 
the future direction of price movements and in some cases the magnitude of 
these price changes. The chief goal of technical analysis is to identify 
trends in past prices successfully and to extrapolate these trends into 
the future (Curley and Bear). A "successful" analysis is one that is 
profitable, but since a very large number of alternative techniques exists, 
it is essentially impossible to find "the most profitable" method. Tech­
nical analysis is carried out by the "application of specific well defined 
rules or equations (Kaufman, 1978, p. 7). These trading rules can range 
from relatively straightforward to esoteric and complex. In general, 
technical analysis takes the form of either interpreting past price for­
mations, as reflected in some type of price chart, or relying on a set of 
mechanistic trading rules designed to isolate commodity price trends (Weaver). 
In the following paragraphs three of the more popular types of technical 
analysis are presented to provide an indication of the diversity of the 
various trading systems.
Chart analysis
A basic tool of the technical analyst is the price chart. All of the 
trading techniques presented here can be (and often are) represented through 
the means of such charts. Chart analysis differs from other technical 
methods in that it relies on interpretation of price formations rather than 
on a set of mechanical trading rules.
One method of constructing price graphs is the use of vertical line 
or bar charts. Such diagrams are constructed with the vertical scale re­
ferring to price and the horizontal scale referring to time, usually in 
units of days or weeks. In the case of the daily price chart, the day1s 
high and low price (for a particular commodity and contract month) are 
plotted and connected with a vertical line, and the closing price is denoted 
by a small horizontal line or "tick” at the appropriate price. Thus, the 
chart provides a record of the daily price range and of the daily closing 
price. An example of a vertical line chart is shown in Figure 1. The 
chart covers daily trading of the December corn contract from September 19, 
1975 through November 26, 1975,
3Figure 1.
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4The process of forecasting price movements using chart analysis con­
sists of:
*..identifying the various patterns established by prices as 
they pursue their various trends and sidewise formations.
These patterns disclose the relative strength of supply and 
demand forces. Each formation has its own significance which 
the chartist coordinates with various other technical con­
siderations in arriving at market conclusions (Jiler, p . 23),
If a particular pattern of price movement preceded a significant price 
increase (or decrease) in the past, then this pattern is used as a fore­
casting tool for future trading decisions. In the colorful lexicon of the 
chart analyst some examples of price formations are "head and shoulders " 
saucers," "triangles," "pennants," "flags" and so on.
Sidestepping the issue of whether the basic concept of chart analysis 
is valid (i.e. past price formations will repeat themselves and that this 
provides a useful means for identifying imminent price trends), two important 
limitations of chart analysis must be recognised. The first limitation is 
the degree of subjectivity necessary in interpreting price patterns. It 
Is quite difficult to interpret price formations as they develop. The 
chartist must watch for many trade indicators, which sometimes seem con­
tradictory. Although charting is quite popular among speculative traders, 
a fairly high level of expertise must be acquired before using this method 
of technical analysis. For many farmers the time required to -gain this 
expertise may be prohibitive. The subjective nature of chart analysis also 
prohibits an objective empirical test of this method of technical analysis, 
making it difficult to assess whether this type of technical analysis can 
lead to improved marketing performance (for an enthusiastic discussion of 
chart analysis see Kluis et al).
A second limitation of chart analysis is that formations are often 
indecisive. The corn-for-grain producer, with an open cash market position, 
is not protected from price risk, and time spent waiting for an opportune 
price to place a hedge leaves the cash market position vulnerable to ad­
verse price movements. Indecisive trade signals can result in missing good 
opportunities at which to initiate a hedge.
Price charts, however, can provide a clear and concise summary of past 
price movements. Price charts can increase a producer1s awareness of 
current prices and of price behavior and when used in conjunction with 
other decision criteria can perhaps lead to improved marketing decisions.
Point and figure analysis
Point and figure analysis can be used to aid trading decisions either 
by assisting in the interpretation of charts or by incorporating the analysis 
into a set of mechanical trading rules. The following discussion is limited 
to one of numerous possible sets of trading rules using point and figure 
analysis.
5Point and figure charts provide a visual record of the magnitude
and direction of price changes while eliminating the time dimension of 
price changes. A chart is constructed by dividing the vertical scale 
into equal price increments or boxes. From the beginning o t e pric 
series price changes are recorded by marking the chart with a series of 
X’s as*prices increase or 0's as prices decrease. The same vertical column 
L  used as long as prices are moving in one direction Each box is^filled 
only if the price change is equal to or greater than the box size._ If 
prices reverse by a specified multiple of the box size, then t e pric 
changes are recorded in the adjacent vertical column starting one box 
above the bottom of the previous column for a price “ ^ e a s e ^ o n ^ b ^  
below the top of the previous column for a price deer a . _
is then filled with the appropriate marks as price changes until
reversal in price occurs. _3/
Part A of Figure 2 is a point and figure chart 
contract between September 19, 1975 and November 26, using $.01 pr^_
increments or box size and a $.03 minimum reversal criterion. It was c
structed using the daily closing prices shown m  Table 1. (Point and g
charts can also be constructed using high or low_prices.) The clos g
price of $3.09 on the first day of the price series and $3.05 on the second 
day establish the initial downward direction of prices, and start ng wi 
the initial price of $3.09, five 0's are plotted in the first column On 
Day 3 the price declined to $3.01 and four additional boxes were fill •
On Dav 4 prices closed at $3.03, an increase in price but less than the _ 
minimum reversal size; therefore, no new boxes were fiUed. On _ay p^ ® s
closed at $3.05 1/2, a 4 1/2 cent increase from the/ “ i the Idjacent
1-hus the price change exceeded the minimum reversal and the adjacent
to
o^the^hart'wa^then™completed in this manner, moving one column to the 
right if the reversal exceeded $.03.
Point and figure analysis recognizes that prices can trend sideways, 
fluctuating up and down within relatively small bands while providing n 
opportunities for the commodities trader. The first four co “f * 1® 0 “
A Figure 2 exhibit this price behavior with corn closing at $3.05 on Day
2* going6through three $.03 reversals and closing at $3.06 on Day 9 
Trends are not established, and therefore trade signals not given until
prices move out of this so-called "congestion" area.
A number of mechanical trading rules for point and_figure analysis
have been developed; however, the simplest rule geiaerating^ " o n e ^ o x  
is to buy when an X is plotted in the current column at least one box 
above the highest X in the last column of X’s. A sell signal is giv 
when an 0 is plotted at least one box below the lowest 0 m  the last
column of 0's (Kaufman, 1980). These buy and 8811 assump-
fpr-rpd to as "double tops" and double bottoms, respectively.
tion of point and figure analysis (as in all technical methods that attempt
3/ The minimum number of X's or 0's in any vertical
1 to the size of the reversal specified divided by
column will be equal 
the box size.
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7Table 1. Prices Used in 
December Corn
Constructing Point and Figure Charts,
T)fl v d ■ a// Price— Day Price Day Price
1 3.09 18 2.96 35 2.75
2 3.05 19 2.93 36 2.73
3 3.01 20 2.95 37 2.69
4 3.03 21 2.91 1/2 38 2.67
5 3.05 1/2 22 2.92 39 2.65
6 3.06 1/2 23 2.85 1/2 40 2.64 1/2
7 3.03 24 2.84 41
2.65
8 3.03 25 2.83 42 2.65 1/2
9 3.06 26 2.81 1/2 43
2.61 1/2
10 2.96 1/2 27 2.75 44 2.59 1/2
11 2.98 1/2 28 2.75 45
2.61
12 2.97 1/2 29 2.77 1/2 46
2.65
13 2.99 30 2.81 1/2 47
2.75
14 3.00 1/2 31 2.77 48
2.71 1/2
15 3.00 32 2.73 1/2 49
2.73
16 3.00 33 2.74 1/2
17 2.92 1/2 34 2.77 1/2 _„ _____ „—
a/ Midpoint of closing price range of December corn contract 9 19 75 to 
' 11-26-75. Rounded to nearest 1/2 cent.
8to identify trends) is that once a trend in prices has been identified by 
a double top or bottom the trend will continue into the future long enough 
for profits to accrue to the trader using such a system.
Again, referring to Part A of Figure 2, a sell signal is .given in the 
fifth column. On the tenth day of the price series, prices declined from 
$3.06 to $2.96 1/2, resulting in the plotting of an 0 well below the last 
column of 0 s and signaling the presence of a downward trend in prices.
Four additional double bottoms are seen in the chart, but presumably a 
trader following such a system would have sold after the first sell signal 
and would take no action until a buy signal occurred. No buy signal occurs 
in the remainder of the price series shown here. Towards the end of the 
price series, however, prices were increasing and, had they reached $2.78 
without reversing, a buy signal would have been given. A trader following 
this trading rule would have closed out his short position on the basis of 
such a signal.
The key parameters of the point and figure analysis, which the analyst 
must select, are the box size and minimum reversal size. Part B of Figure 
2 is a chart of the same December corn price series constructed using a 
$.02 box size and a $.04 minimum reversal (or 2 box reversal). As can be 
seen, larger box and reversal sizes condense the record of price changes.
In general, the smaller the box and reversal size the more sensitive the 
system will be to price changes and the more trade signals will be gener­
ated over a given set of prices.
Moving averages
Moving average analysis is a technique that attempts to isolate price 
trends by calculating averages of past prices. Moving averages act as a 
smoothing device, removing extreme price fluctuations and (in theory) re­
vealing the true direction of the underlying price movement.
A moving average is easy to calculate, update and graph. Given a 
price series P^, P2, P^s *•- pt and a moving average length of n periods, 
the moving average price at time t is
“ t = (1/n) (Pt + V l  + Pt-2 + ''' + Pt-n+l) •
The value of the moving average price in the next time period (MA ) is
calculated by adding the current closing price (P ) and dropping the
oldest price (P ,,).t—n+1
M t+i - (1/n) (Pf+1 + Pt + Pt_x + ... + Pt_n+2).
A short-cut formula for updating the moving average is presented by Kaufman 
(1978, p. 58):
MA = MA n + (1/n) (P - P ). t t-1 7 t t-n'
9That is the current moving average price is equal to the previous moving
average plus the n day average of the difference between the current price
and the oldest price dropped.
For example, If a three-day moving average is computed from the data
in Table ls the averages are as follows:
(1/3) (3.09 + 3.05 4- 3.01) - 3 ,05
(1/3)(3.05 + 3.01 + 3.03) = 3.03
(1/3)(3.01 4- 3.03 + 3.055) = 3.0317, and so on.
Alternatively, the last moving average could have been computed as 
3.03 + 1/3 (3.055 - 3.05)= 3.03 + .0017 = 3.0317.
Figure 3 shows a plot of 3 day moving average price,3 cal^ ated ^  
the December corn contract closing prices given m  Table 1. The actual
closing prices also are plotted.
A simple moving average weights each day's price equally. As prices 
change over time, each new closing price will affect the moving average 
but its influence will be tempered by the magnitude of the Prec^ “ | Prl£ ' 
When futures prices are declining the moving average will also ^line, bu 
will generally lag behind the daily closing price. :If ^ 3 *
moving average price will continue downward until the weight of the pr 
increases causes the moving average to also reverse.
Bv itself a single moving average does not provide a forecast. The
mechanism used to generate buy and sell signals is, in_this example, the
crossover of the daily closing price and the 3 day moving ^Ice^fnatures'
tthiie the daily price is greater than the moving average price f^ u 
nrices are trending upwards. If the daily price becomes less than the moving 
average price, it is viewed as an indication of a new downward direction^ 
prices and signals an opportunity to sell futures contracts. malntalned
following such a system the short futures position would then be maintained 
until the daily price becomes greater than the moving average signaling 
an ijward movement. Using a crossover of a 3 day movi,ig average price and 
daily closing price as a mechanism for a trade signal, fourteen buy and 
sell signals occur in Figure 3.
The crossover mechanism for generating trad:ing :signals can be ^ e^ e d
to multiple moving averages of two or £e* f  %  ^ t h S ’ price flue-
10 day moving averages for illustration (Figure 4), the daily price tlu 
tuations Ire smoothed twice, first with the shorter 3 day moving average 
and again with the longer 10 day average. When prices are trending upw , 
the 3§dav moving average price will be increasing more rapidly than the 
day average, and thus will eventually become greater than the 10 day averag • 
fprlces reverse, the faster 3 day average will start decreasing and will 
eventually become less than the slower 10 day average A “ W^ " “ ver
tion in price is indicated by the 3 day a y e ™ ^  " ossI^ellmp^ Ild f S u r e s  price, and a trader relying on such a system would, for ’ £ f_
with the expectation that futures price would continue to decline f
licient duration for profits to accrue to the short futures position.
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A key concept of moving average analysis must be noted. This type 
analysis does not attempt to predict imminent trends in prices nor does it 
attempt to initiate trades at either the high or the low prices in a series. 
Rather, the objective is to identify trends in prices after they have be­
come established, Moving averages are trend following devices. The under- 
lying assumption is that identifiable trends exist in the price series and 
that a moving average system can successfully isolate these trends after 
they have started.
A triple crossover system uses three different length moving averages.
In such an analysis, two moving averages are supplemented by a third, shorter 
length, confirming average. This type analysis is illustrated in Figure 5 
using a 3/5/10 day set of moving averages based on the December corn prices 
from Table 1. A downtrend is indicated when the 3 day moving average price 
is below the 5 day average price which in turn is below the 10 day average 
price. A buy signal is given when the opposite condition holds. Although 
not shown in Figure 5, it is possible for the 5 day average to briefly cross 
above the 10 day average without the 3 day average confirming a new price 
trend. The inclusion of the third, confirming average is an attempt to avoid 
false signals given by temporary reversals in price. The triple crossover 
system results in trade signals being delayed until trends become better 
established. The tradeoff is that a delayed trading signal might result in 
the opening of a futures position after a substantial portion of the price 
movement has already taken place.
In addition to the number of averages selected, three other parameters 
must be specified, either explicitly or implicitly, when using a moving 
average system. As noted above, the nature of moving averages is that they 
have the effect of smoothing out daily price fluctuations and have the property 
°f lagging behind actual price changes. One parameter that will determine 
the degree of smoothing and how rapidly the averages reflect changes in 
prices is the length chosen for the averages. As the length of the moving 
average- increases the sensitivity of the moving average to daily changes in 
prices is reduced. In general, the longer length moving averages will smooth 
out the shorter-run reversals in prices, but will still signal major changes 
in the direction of prices. Conversely, a shorter length moving average is 
more sensitive to price changes and can generate more frequent trading sig­
nals. Since the moving average is lagging behind actual price changes, in 
times of rapidly fluctuating prices short length moving averages can result 
in a downtrend being signaled after prices have reversed and are moving 
higher, followed by an uptrend being signaled when prices are moving lower. 
Unprofitable trades resulting from such false confirmation of trend are often 
referred to as "whipsaw" losses.
Attempts to reduce these false signals have been made by developing 
different penetration or confirmation rules to use in conjunction with moving 
average rules. Penetration rules specify an amount (in terms of price) that 
the shorter moving average must penetrate the longer moving average before 
a trade signal is given. Thus, in a 3/10 day moving average system the pene­
tration parameter might be set, say, at $.03. A sell signal then requires 
that the 3 day average cross below the 10 day average and be at least $.03 
less than the 10 day moving average price. Similar to the tradeoff between 
length of moving averages and number of trading signals given, the larger 
the value of the penetration parameter the fewer trends will be identified
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and hence fewer trades initiated. The example graphed in Figure 3 has 
the penetration parameter set at zero. Increasing this parameter to $.03 
reduces the number of trade signals from 14 to 4.
Another parameter of a moving average system is the weights chosen 
for the prices used in calculating the average. In the previous examples, 
each price in the average is weighted equally. Alternative weighting 
schemes exist. One is linear weighting, where for an n length moving 
average the oldest price in the moving average is given a weight of 1, 
the next price is given a weight of 2, and so on with the current price 
given a weight of n.. The average is computed by dividing the weighted sum 
of prices by the sum of the weights. Such a system gives more weight to 
recent prices and is thought to make the system more responsive to abrupt 
changes in prices. The effect of linear weighting is to reduce the delay 
between the start of a new trend in prices and the triggering of a trade 
signal. Two other weighting methods are exponential weighting and weighting 
past prices by the number of days spent in a specified price range (Kaufman, 
1978).
In summary, there are four critical parameters in a moving average 
system of technical analysis. These are
(1) the number of averages selected,
(2) the length (number of days) chosen for the averages,
(3) the penetration value, and
(4) the weighting of the individual prices used in calculating the 
moving averages.
Clearly countless parameter combinations may be chosen for a moving average 
system, and one of the problems of technical analysis is determining an 
"optimal" parameter mix. Technical analysts view this largely as an em­
pirical question, taking a trial—and—error approach to parameter combina­
tions. A series of past prices are used to test alternatives, and net 
trading profit is the usual criterion for selecting the "best" system for 
a particular commodity. Application of such an empirically selected system 
of trading rules assumes, of course, that a system that worked in the past 
will also identify trends in the future successfully.
Analysis of Hedging Strategies 
Methods
Our research approach is to compare the average price and the variability 
of price from selling corn via different strategies. This report covers five 
alternatives. Two represent extremes: never hedge and always (routinely)
hedge. These alternatives provide two benchmarks for appraising three 
selective hedging strategies.
15
In the never hedge alternative, the farmer’s return is simply the 
harvesttime cash price in Western New York. (Strategies for storing and 
marketing corn throughout the storage season are not considered in this 
report.) A second alternative is to hedge routinely. This means selling 
December futures near planting time of each year and then buying back the 
futures contract at harvesttime (additional detail is^given in appendix). 
The farmer’s return equals the cash price plus the gain or loss from t e 
futures transaction.
A third alternative involves a selective hedging strategy, which 
specifies a target price and attempts to achieve the target by hedging.
A typical objective would be a price that covered production costs plus 
some additional return, which the farmer sets. To use this strategy, the 
farmer must have an estimate of the local basis for corn at harvesttime; 
this basis is the difference between the price of the December future at 
harvest and the local cash price on the same date. If for example the^ 
local'basis is $0.20, then selling Chicago futures at $3.00 per bushel is 
equivalent to a local price of $2.80 per bushel. Thus, if a farmer had an 
objective of obtaining $2.75, he or she would sell futures if the futures 
price reached $2.95. The hedge is completed, as usual, by selling futures 
when the cash corn is harvested and sold.
This type selective hedge has an absolute price objective, and as 
mentioned earlier, such an objective may not be achievable every year.
Price may never reach, say, $2.95, and hence no hedge is placed. Thus, 
the farmer's return in some years will be just the harvesttime cash price. 
When a hedge is placed, the return will include the gain or loss from the 
futures position. Clearly the average return will be influenced by the 
price objective which influences the frequency of hedging. For our simu 
lations we used cost data from Cornell Cost Account records, and set as 
an objective a price 10 cents per bushel above costs. The bases- the 
differences between Chicago and local prices— used m  the analysis were 
obtained from historical relationships in Western New York (see appendix).
The precision with which the harvesttime basis can be predicted will m  
fluence the performance of this type strategy.
The fourth and fifth alternatives are two "multiple hedging" strategies 
based on moving average rules. One strategy uses 3/10 day averages, the
other 10/40 day averages. Sales and purchases of futures are made during 
the growing season for corn using rules like those described m  the previous 
section. The particular averages used in this study were selected because 
they are readily available (or easy to compute) and are frequently used.
We made no attempt to find an "optimal" set of parameters i.e., average 
lengths or weights which would maximize returns from the futures transaction
for this particular period.
Multiple hedging strategies attempt to achieve a high relative price 
each year. A farmer would not want to sell while prices are trending up 
ward, but would like to sell near the top of the trend. As explained above, 
a moving average of past prices cannot identify the top of a trend but it 
may°permit sails at ?elatively high prices. Assuming the technical analysis 
has identified a sale of futures, this position is held as long as prices 
are trending downward, but if prices start to trend upward, the position 
in futures is offset by a purchase. Thus, "multiple hedging involves m  
and-out trading in futures, and indeed it is analogous to speculation on
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changes in futures prices. The return to the farmer equals the cash price 
plus the gains and losses from the (possibly large) series of transactions 
in futures.
The analyses use prices for the crop years 1972-80, The cash prices 
represent a harvesttime low price in Western New York; it is a representa­
tive^ price that a typical corn grower, say in the Batavia area, could have 
obtained at, or just after, harvest. The futures prices used are daily 
closing prices for the December contract (traded on the Chicago Board of 
Trade).
Our analysis attempts to parallel reality as closely as possible, but 
at times simplifying assumptions were necessary to keep the simulations 
tractable. The same assumptions are made for each strategy, and the hedging 
results, therefore, should be comparable with each other. But the average 
incomes and the measures of variability of income, which we report, would 
not coincide exactly with the figures for an actual hedging program for a 
specific farmer.
The assumptions made can be classified into two categories: those per­
taining to the mechanics of computing returns from the futures trades and 
certain ancillary assumptions which would be unique to an individual pro­
ducer- In the first category, for example, we assumed that futures trans­
actions were made at the midpoint of the opening range of futures prices; 
actual transactions, of course, could have been made at slightly different 
prices. The second category of assumptions relates to such things as the 
quality of corn (number 2 yellow) being sold, the cost of hedging, and the 
costs of production. The important point is, however, that the results should 
be treated as illustrations of relative performance of selected pricing strat­
egies in a particular time period and not as forecasts of returns that an 
individual farmer would obtain if the strategy were applied in a different 
period.
Empirical results
The results of the alternative strategies are presented in terms of 
net prices 1 in Table 2. The net price equals the cash price received at 
harvest adjusted for the gain or loss from the futures transactions, in­
cluding the margin and commission costs, kj The procedure assumes that the 
quantity hedged (sold and bought in futures) exactly equals the quantity of 
cash grain sold. Table 2 also presents the average net price and the stan­
dard deviation of price for two time periods. The standard deviation is a 
common measure of variability, and like the average, is stated in dollars 
per bushel. A large standard deviation, of course, implies large variability.
M  NP = CP + FR - HC, FR - FPs - F P b H C  = TCC + TIC, where NP = net price 
($/bu.), CP = cash price at harvest, FR = return from futures trades, 
FPs - selling price of futures contract, FPb = buying price of futures 
contract, HC = hedging costs per bushel, TCC commission charges per 
bushel, and TIC = interest on margin funds per bushel.
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Table 2. Net Prices Under Alternative Hedging Programs
Strategy — a/
Cash
Sale
Routine Selective hedges—
Year hedge I II
III
1972 1.35 1.25
per bu. 
1.35 1.31 1.30
1973 2.30 1.36 1.54
2.12 1.94
1974 3.20 1.96 2.02
2.72 2.90
1975 2.15 1.98 2.01
2.22 2.31
1976 2.15 2.42 2.44
2.38 2.38
1977 1.95 2.32 1.95
2.20 1.95
1978 2.10 2.26 2.10
2.26 2.37
1979 2.45 2.42 2.72
2.57 2.38
1980 3.05 2.21 2.26
2.80 2.80
1972-80
average 2.30 2.02 2.04 2.29
2.26
standard deviation 0.56 0.44 0.42 0.44
0.48
1975-80
average 2.31 2.27 2.25 2.41
2.37
standard deviation 0.40 0.16 0.29 0.24
0.27
,/ Selective hedge I is the target price hedge; sales m  futures were 
~ made if the target (production costs plus lOp/hu.) could be reac e . 
Selective hedge II is a multiple hedging strategy using 3/10 d y 
averages, and III is a multiple hedging strategy using 10/40 day 
averages.
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The averages and standard deviations are computed for two periods, 
1972-80 and 1975-80. Prices in 1972 were still heavily influenced by price 
supports, and prices in 1973 and 1974 reflected a shift to a period of 
freer markets with small stocks and were years of volatile prices. The 
1975-80 period is: perhaps a period that might more nearly represent price 
behavior in the 1980s.
The results 'suggest that hedging reduces the variability of prices 
relative to selling corn in the cash market without hedging, but clearly 
the specific results of our analysis are influenced by the time period 
selected. For the entire period, the hedging programs reduced variability 
by^modest amounts, and there was a considerable f,cost" in terms of lower 
prices received, on average, than from the simple cash sale strategy.
The results for the 1975—80 period are probably more representative 
of those one might expect on logical grounds. Namely, routine hedging 
sharply reduces the annual variability of price with a small penalty in 
average price; this penalty is related mainly to the cost of using the 
futures market; selective hedging strategies result in price variability 
that is intermediate between not hedging and routinely hedging. The mul­
tiple hedging strategies (selective hedges II and III) did provide somewhat 
higher returns, on average, for the 1975-80 period than did the other al­
ternatives .
The relatively poor performance of the target price strategy (selective 
hedge I) is related to the difficulty of estimating the harvesttime basis 
in Western New York. In this approach, futures were sold at the point in 
time after May 1 when the Chicago futures price minus the assumed basis 
gave a localized price equal to the desired target. In an initial analysis, 
the basis was estimated as the arithmetic mean of the median bases in the 
month of November of the previous three years. In this sample period, how­
ever , the historical basis obtained in this way tended to underestimate the 
actual basis, and if, for example, the basis is expected to be 20 cents 
per bushel but in fact turns out to be 30 cents, then the net price received 
will be 10 cents less than the intended target price.
After the initial poor results, we revised our estimate of the basis 
by averaging the largest basis for each of the three previous years, and 
these are the results reported in Table 2, In three out of nine years, 
futures prices did not reach a sufficiently high level to achieve the tar­
get, and in these years the return is merely the cash price. In other 
years, our more conservative approach to estimating the basis still did 
not yield the intended target. Thus, the target price was reached or ex­
ceeded in only two of the nine sample years. Clearly, if this type of 
selective hedge is going to be successful in Western New York, we need 
more accurate ways of estimating the forthcoming, harvesttime basis in 
order to have a more precise estimate of the price being established by 
the hedge. This must await further research.
Since the multiple hedging strategies had a higher average net price 
than did the cash sale alternative in the 1975—80 period, the technical 
analysis provided speculative returns to the futures trading, net of the 
costs of trading. In contrast, the lower net price for the multiple hedging 
strategies over the long time period implies speculative losses from the
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numerous transactions in futures.^ Even thcagh the 1 9 ^  74 pe^od mght be 
considered somewhat unusual, the inability o e e shall
handle these unusual years profitably is of concern. A1 , .
demonstrate in a subsequent section ta^nical analyses
lative profits in particular years, but this is not necessarily f 
of performance in subsequent years.
The profit performance of multiple hedging strategies is 
detail in Tables 3 and 4. The number of futures markets transactions^ 
each year and the gross profit from each transaction are reported. The 
average number of round-turn trades was seven per year or ^
strategy Yearly gross profits ranged from a low of $ 1862.50 m  
a high of $153115 in 1976. Forty percent of the 63 trades were profitable 
before deducting hedging costs. Total gross profits for the 1972 80 perio 
were $2793 75 an amount that was not sufficient to cover hedging co . 
Total$profits were greatly influenced by the 1973 anc1 197 per ormance of 
the moving average system. Twelve of 16 trades resulted “  ^ i ^ o n  evidence 
two years combined. The moving average system gave sell slsn^ . .
of do^turns in prices, yet these downturns proved temporary resulting in
numerous losses.
The longer (10/40 day) averages used in solectl^ hedging strategy^11 
reduced the number of round-turn trades to an average of . P ? 
the nine-year test period. Yearly gross profits ranged from a low of 
$-1712 50 in 1973 to a high of $1287.50 in 1976. Forty-three percent of 
the u'trades were profitable and total gross profits
were $-956.25. The smaller q3 per bushel less than
t“  Strategy^!, L  indication that the ^
system was not that sensitive to the lengths of the averages chos
The futures market losses seen in the simulation of strategies_II and
S S £ . '  The^trade sig=
cision^was^a'significan^improvement^over maintaining
a hedged position regardless of subsequent price behavior (Table )
Not surprisingly, strategy II had the highest average hedging costs of 
3 075 ner bushel. This was due to the commission charges for the 1 g
slightly offset by a reduction m  the costs of keeping g
fully margined.
Table 6 provides an indication of how the funds required to meet margin 
requirements differed between the multiple hedging strategies and the oth
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Table 3. Gross Profits from Futures Trades, Using 3/10 Day Averages,
(Selective Strategy II), 1972-1980
1973 1974
-dollars per contract-
1975 1976Trade
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
Yearly
Total
Trade
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
Yearly
Total
1972
147.00
-65.75
-197.00
331.25
-172.00
43.50
1977
368.75
175.00
1112.50
506.25
-400.00
-250.00
1512,50
-231.25
-450.00
-675.00
2400.00
-350.00
-512.00
-700.00
-518.50
1978
50.00 
1450.00
25.00 
-287.50 
-343.75
187.50
1081.25
675.00
-350.00
-675.00
-450.00
0 .0 0
-25.00
-1162.50
-87.50
212.50
-1862.50
1979
62.50
6.25
-875.00
-50.00
1437.50
-125.00
-262.50
487.50
387.50
1068.75
137.50 
-400.00
-12.50
-387.50
-925.00
362.50 
1975.00
750.00
1980
0.00
-118.75
-250.00
25.00
-50.00
-375.00
-93.75
-812.50
-481.00 
-75.00 
-812.50 
500.00 
-400.00 
887.50 
1912.50
1531.25
1972-80
Total
2793.75
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Table 4. Gross Profits from Futures Trades Using 10/40 Day Averages,(Selective Strategy III)» 1972 1980
Trade 1972 1973 1974
1975 1976
dollars per contracL- - -
1 62.50 -1712.50 -1437.50
-1025.00
25.00
-581.25
1868.75
2 -206.25 2006.25
3
Yearly
Total -143.75 -1712.50 -1437.50
1006.25 1287.50
1972-80
Trade 1977 1978 1979
1980 Total
1393.75 -600.00 -562.501
2 356.25
-543.75
3
Yearly
Total __ 1393.75 -243.75
-1106.25 -956.25
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Table 5. Gross Returns from Futures Transactions
Year
Routine
hedge SelectiveII (3/10)
hedges
TTT /I nf/.n\
i 1-------—j “ ~ dollars per contract-
J-J- -L  ^J_U/ )
1972 -500 43.50 -143.75
1973 -4350 -518.50 -1712.50
1974 -5900 -1862.50 -1437.50
1975 -950 750.00 1006.25
1976 1600 1531.25 1287.50
1977 1650 1512.50 a/
1978 800 1081.25 1393.75
1979 100 1068.75 -243.75
1980 -3400 -812.50 -1106.25
Total -10,950 2793.75 -956.25
a/ No trades.
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Table 6. Maximum Funds Per Contract 
Requirements, 1972-1980
Needed to Meet Annual Margin
Strategy
Routine
hedge I
Selective Hedges 
II III
1972 1530
a /
per contract-----
.1073 992
1973 9969 9279 3533 3857
1974 9274 9274 4836 2732
1975 4787 4787 2871 2833
1976 2870 2870 2554 1841
1977 803 — 1000
—
1978 2317 — 1004 1000
1979 3632 2247 2043 1667
1980 5514 5514 2117 2265
a/ Indicates year that crop remained unhedged.
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hedging strategies.— In the simulations, declining prices resulted in 
profits accruing to the futures position that could be withdrawn and used 
to reduce the outstanding loan balance, while rising prices resulted in 
margin calls and the necessity of borrowing additional funds to keep the 
futures position fully margined. Therefore, the loan balance fluctuated 
throughout the production period. The figures shown in Table 6 represent 
the maximum funds borrowed to meet margin requirements at any point in the 
production periods.
Two points are illustrated in Table 6. First, in years of rising 
prices (e.g. 1973 and 1974) substantial capital was required to meet margin 
requirements. Second, the multiple hedging strategies reduced the capital 
requirements for margin deposits relative to the routine hedging strategy. 
Further, the number of margin calls observed in the simulation of the mul­
tiple hedging strategies was reduced substantially compared to all the other 
strategies. The behavior of the loan balance is additional evidence that 
the multiple hedging strategies were somewhat successful in meeting the ob­
jective of lifting a hedge in times of rising prices and placing or re­
placing a hedge in times of declining prices.
5 /
Simulation Results with Idealized Data
Given the foregoing results, an important question is whether or not 
similar results can be expected in future years if these simple multiple 
hedging strategies are used. To investigate this question, we constructed 
a series of hypothetical data, with known properties, and applied the trading 
rules based on moving averages to these data.
Two sets of prices were constructed: one based on conditions repre­
senting the 1975-80 situation and the other for the 1973-74 situation. Each 
data set consisted of 20 replications or "years/1 each containing 300 "days" 
of prices and were constructed in the form of a random difference price 
series. The "daily" price change represents the price effect of new infor­
mation entering the market as a random variable. In 1973/74, prices were 
highly variable, and the standard deviation of the daily price change was 
5.5 cents per bushel; average price was $2,40, In 1975—80, prices were less 
variable, and the standard deviation of the daily price change was 3,3 cents 
per bushel; average price was $2.70. 6/
5/ The hedger is assumed to be able to borrow sufficient funds to meet margin 
requirements. The interest charged on the loan balance is used as a mea­
sure of the cost of margin deposits,
_6/ The series were generated assuming that the average change in price was 
zero, that changes were statistically independent of each other, and that 
the changes were normally distributed. The standard deviations of the 
changes were those estimated for the respective time periods as are the 
average levels of prices. This probably represents an "idealization" of 
price behavior— i.e., the series contains fewer imperfections than actual 
prices— but the data do contain the constraint that daily price changes can­
not exceed 10 cents, which is the daily limit on price moves on the Chicago 
Board of Trade. If the computer program generated a change larger than 10 
cents in one day, the excess over 10 is added to the next day’s price.
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In the analysis which follows, replications 1-20 represent the type of 
conditions experienced in 1975-80 while replications 21-40 represent the 
conditions of the more variable 1973-74 period. The high and l ^ P r i c e  
for each random difference price series is shown in Table 7. These'pr 
ranges illustrate that even a truly random price series will exhib P 
movements or "trends." Comparison of the price ranges for thetwo sets of 
replications indicate that, as expected, a higher variability in daily pr
changes (replications 21-40) results in a greater range m  p! ^ e^ d i s t a n c e
That is, the more variable the daily price change, the greater the distance
the price series can wander *
Speculative trading of one 5,000 bushel corn contract was simulat e d f «
each of the forty price series based on signals generated by a d o i ^  used 
moving average system, using the same two sets of moving average lengths used 
in the hedging analysis: the 3/10 day moving average system, a faster set
of moving averages, and the 10/40 day moving average system, a slower set 
of averages. In bith cases the shorter average had to penetrate the longer 
average by a minimum of 1/4 cent before a trade signal was given. This wa 
done to minimize the effect of rounding errors when computing the moving 
averages,
The trading simulations were carried out so that once a “ ade ,
was given a position was held until the opposite signal emerged. For exampl , 
if the initial signal indicated a downtrend, a short (sale of futures) posi 
tion was taken and held until the moving average system signalled an uPtr . 
The short position was then closed and a long position taken. Market posi­
tion was reversed in this manner until expiration of the contract. A com­
mission charge of $50 per round-turn trade was deducted from gross profits 
to determine net profits for the individual trades.
The results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. Examining first the results 
of replications 1-20, the 3/10 day system resulted in positive gross Profits 
in 13Pout of 20 trials. When aggregated over all 20 replications the trading 
rule resulted in $14,253 profit before deducting commissions. The large 
number of trades, however, resulted in a total brokerage charge of $30,400 
resulting in a tital net loss of $16,147. For the 10/40 day system sxx of 
20 trials had positive gross profits. Total losses were $16,495 before de 
ducting for commission charges. A total of 170 trades added brokerage charges 
of $8,500, increasing the total loss to $25,047.
For replications 21-40, with a higher variability of daily price change, 
the performance of the two moving average systems is reversed (Table 9).
Only seven of 20 trials of the 3/10 day system resulted in positive Sross 
orofits and again, the large number of transactions resulted m  high 
trading’costs feeding to a net loss of $36,813. For the 10/40 day system,
12 of 20 replications had positive gross profits, and after ® 
mission charges on 141 trades, total net profits were $18,941 a fairly 
impressive performance of the trading rule.
The results of the speculative trading simulations show that even an 
arbitrarily chosen trading rule can, at times, generate iron *
“ rice series. These results could possibly be improved through
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Table 7. Price Ranges of Hypothetical Price Series, All Replications
/ High Low ■U / High LowReplication— Price Price Replication—'f Price Price
-dollars per bushel- -dollars per bushel-
1 2.80 2.29 21 2.44 .442 2.95 2.02 22 2.51 .58
3 2.77 2.20 23 3.18 1.704 4.18 2.50 24 2.72 1.595 3.06 1.75 25 5.05 2.326 3.28 2.49 26 3.10 1.91
7 2.98 2.49 27 2.75 1.578 2.70 1.85 28 2.58 .579 3.36 2,56 29 3.45 2.0510 3.05 2.55 30 3.09 1.3911 2.70 1.75 31 3.99 2.3112 2.82 1.48 32 3.13 1.66
13 3.03 2.48 33 2.53 1.51
14 3.16 2.62 34 3.42 2.29
15 2.91 2.37 35 2.49 1.38
16 3.08 2.26 36 2.84 1,70
17 3.84 2.66 37 3.24 1.85
18 3.70 2.55 38 4.03 2.17
19 2.84 1.60 39 3.89 2.38
20 4.02 2.63 40 2.82 .51
a/ Initial price, PQ = 2.70 Daily price change, e ~ N(0,.033)
bj Initial price, P^ = 2.40 Daily price change, e ~ N(0,,055)
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Table 8. Profit Results from Simulation of Speculative Trading, 
Replications 1-20
3/10 Moving Average 10/40 Moving Average
Replication
Gross i 
Profit-
Net
Profit
Gross
Profit
Net
Profit
1 5543 4423
contract —  
-4069 -4619
2 809 -791 3649 3348
3
4
5
-389 -2093 -4089 -4539
1129 -221 7630 7480
2013 813 2329 2079
500 -900 -2488 -3088
7 1071 -179 -2224 -2724
8
Q
2977 1577 -5171 -5621
401 -1249 -174 -624
10 -1432 -3232 -5392 -5992
11 -206 -1906 -2070 -2572
12 -1731 -3431 1977 1727
1 8 -2064 -3964 -1420 -1920XX
1 k 487 -863 -2524 -3024
15
16
897 -502 -2042 -2492
-4556 -6356 -1073 -1523
17 3041 1441 2812 2561
18 3432 2082 -197 -697
19 3758 2308 -3241 -3691
20 -1428 -3128 1282 882
Total— ^ 14,253 -16,171 -16,495 -25,047
a/ All profit results rounded to the nearest dollar - represent trading 
“ of one 5000 bushel "contract."
b/ Totals may not add due to rounding.
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Table 9* Profit Results from Simulation of Speculative Trading, 
Replications 21-40
Replication
3/10 Moving Average 10/40 Moving Average
Gross , 
Profit-
Net
Profit
Gross
Profit
Net
Profit_1 _ 1 1_. _ .. .coiitTa-Cu
21 -4086 -5886 -3090 -3590
22 -2016 -3766 -121 -321
23 2513 1213 6379 6079
24 -4282 -6082 -117 -517
25 -364 -1814 -2304 -2654
26 4577 2927 1193 943
27 -3991 -5941 1533 1233
28 -6159 -7959 3391 3141
29 5043 5593 3422 3072
30 728 -922 9237 9087
31 -3169 -4919 -4434 -4984
32 -9 -1809 5719 5469
33 9788 8588 -2332 -2732
34 3958 2758 -474 -874
35 -2646 -4046 -722 -10 72
36 -903 -2653 950 550
37 -1860 -3510 3705 3305
38 -1564 -3314 3162 2712
39 -4354 -6354 1427 1127
40 4534 3084 -536 -1036
Total— ^ -4263
|
-36,813 25,991 18,941
a/ All profit results rounded to nearest dollar - represents trading
of one 5000 bushel "contract. m
b/ Totals may not add due to rounding.
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"optimization" of the trading rules. That is, one could search  for a rule 
or rules that maximizes profits for the given price series. However su 
a trading rule would be dependent only on the particular data used and 
could not be expected to generate profits for another price series This 
is perhaps obvious, but given the unresolved debate over the true model of_ 
commodity price behavior, these simulations illustrate how results. of tec 
nical analyses may be erroneously interpreted as detecting a systematic 
component in price behavior when none exists.
The example of the 10/40 day system with net losses of $25,000+in 
replications 1-20 and net gains of $18,900+ in replications 21-40 demon­
strates that changes in price behavior (in this case an increase in the 
variability of the daily price changes) can lead to a quite differen p
formance of a trading rule. This illustrates a,State“" f  ‘T ^ p d B t S  to in the technical analysis literature that a trading rule must be updat
conform to changes in price behavior (e.g. increasing price
This however, requires the analyst to predict changes m  price volatii y
ta ordeTto develop a trading rule that will predict changes m  price levels.
Moving average systems are designed to follow the maxim of "cutting 
losses Iho?t while lehing profits run." This idea is seen in the results
of the speculative trading simulation. For most of the mdiv y
t-hP fradine rules resulted in numerous losses and fewer gams (Table 1 )• 
Ho^rer! tL^agritude of the profit from individual trades was o ten greater 
than the magnitude of the losses from the losing trades (Table 11).
For all the simulations, the 3/10 day system had 39 of 40 resuits with 
a larger gain than the largest loss, while for the 10/40 day system 28 of
40 results had gains larger than the largest loss. While not shown 
Table 11 a pattern of gains from individual trades being 1 g 
was seen in ?he majority of the replications. Of course, as implied when 
reporting the profit results, the large number of relatively small losses 
more than offset the small number of relatively large gams resulting 
an aggregate loss for many of the simulations.
The question then Is, given the results obtained in the 
1 ations are moving average systems worthwhile to a com grower. Th
^ u l d V a n s w e r f d  in the context that a producer must be willing
to absorb the price risk Inherent in growing a crop if ® reduce
An t-bp nfhPT- hand if a producer makes the decision to attemp 
p h c f  risk through hedging, it is natural to ask whether the P«fo*numce 
of the hedging program can be improved relative to that offere y rou^ 
hedging 1 h u s i n Sthe narrow context of choosing between routine hedging 
and8mu!tiple hedging based on technical analysis our
that technical analysis can be Partially successfulm identifying turning
points in price movements and in increasing net priceA }  nl__
hedging while reducing price risk relative to unhedged (cash) sales.
Our analysis also indicates, however, that the success of technical 
analysis depended on matching a particular set of moving average rules 
the existing price behavior. The 10/40 day moving average scheme worked 
best, for example, when price changes were relatively varia e. u th 
ability to match the rule to price behavior would Tequ^ e ^ ^ e  or not,
know before trading started whether prices were going to ^ “ lable °* 
and clearly this is something the farmer would not know. This diff y
in defining an appropriate set of rules_for the current situation is a sig- 
nificant limitation of technical analysis.
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Table 10, Number of Trades and Profitable Trades in the Speculative
Trading Simulations, All Replications
Rep.
3/10 Moving 
Average
10/40 Moving 
Average
Rep.
3/10 Moving 
Average
10/40 Moving 
Average
No. Prof. No. Prof. No. Prof. No. Prof.
1 22 12 1 1 4 21 36 10 10 2
2 32 10 6 4 22 35 1 2 ' 4 2
3 33 10 9 1 23 26 13 6 3
4 27 10 3 3 24 36 14 8 3
5 24 10 5 2 25 29 12 7 2
6 28 14 12 3 26 33 15 5 4
7 26 1 1 10 1 27 39 10 6 3
8 28 12 9 2 28 36 1 1 5 3
9 33 1 1 9 2 29 29 1 1 7 3
10 36 14 12 2 30 33 10 3 2
1 1 34 12 10 3 31 35 8 1 1 3
12 34 12 5 3 32 36 12 5 2
13 38 13 9 5 33 24 12 8 5
14 27 1 1 10 1 34 24 9 8 4
15 28 13 9 2 35 28 10 7 2
16 36 10 9 3 36 35 1 1 8 4
17 32 14 5 2 37 33 9 8 5
18 27 1 1 10 3 38 ■ 35 12 9 3
19 29 12 9 4 39 40 16 6 2
20 34 1 1 8 3 40 29 1 1 10 3
Total 608 233 170 53 651 22S 141 60
% Prof. 38 31 35 43
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T a b le  11. L a r g e s t  I n d i v i d u a l  T ra d e  R e s u l t  O b se rve d  i n  th e  S p e c u la t iv e  
T ra d in g  S im u la t io n s s A l l  R e p l ic a t io n s
Replication______ 3/10 10/40__
dollars per contract
1 1515 -1197
2 3669 3357
3 1111 -1177
4 1202 5363
5 1070 3430
6 2281 1344
7 1008 744
8 1850 -1265
9 1431 2279
10 1338 -1098
11 2345 1343
12 1677 2164
13 1222 -800
14 969 -841
15 1089 -1261
16 -828 1304
17 1139 3280
18 2695 2166
19 1539 -1632
20 1657 2678
Replication 3 / 1 0 ____1^/^—---
dollars per contract
2 1 3389 -1372
22 1512 -1488 '
23 1383 4586
24 1781 1627
25 2141 2004
26 ' 1453 -1455
27 2301 3298
28 1931 2812
29 2558 2941
30 3979 5846
31 2807 2185
32 3343 4501
33 3004 -1566
34 2203 1038
35 2754 1752
36 3117 2535
37 2466 3325
38 1990 6086
39 1875 3239
40 5359 3317
Numb e r  
P o s i t i v e 19 12 20
16
a /  R ounded t o  n e a r e s t  d o l l a r .
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Conclusions
u Multiple hedging strategies, unlike other hedging strategies, allow 
"hedges" to he placed and lifted and replaced during a production period.
The intent is to lift a hedge during periods of rising prices and to place 
or replace the hedge during periods of declining prices. Multiple hedging 
strategies are unorthodox. A more traditional view of production hedging 
calls for a hedged position, once taken, to be maintained until the cash 
sale of the commodity. The grower presumably is satisfied with the price 
established by the sale of futures. Losses (or gains) in the futures market 
should be offset by gains (or losses) in the cash market. As a practical 
matter, however, hedgers often find it difficult to maintain positions in 
futures until the crop is sold, a la? a bonafide hedge. The temptation may 
be to liquidate the futures position either to take profits that have accrued 
or conversely to cut short mounting losses. Our analysis can be viewed as 
testing multiple hedging strategies to examine whether simple technical 
trading rules can provide a disciplined means for determining whether to 
place a hedge and whether it should be lifted or replaced given subsequent 
developments in prices.
Over the nine-year test period the multiple hedging strategies yielded 
a significantly higher average price than that received from routine hedging. 
The variability of returns was slightly greater. The mean net price for 
the two multiple hedging strategies averaged $.03'per bushel below that 
received from a cash sales (only) strategy. For the 1975/80 sub-period the 
multiple hedging strategies had an average price that exceeded the price 
received by all other strategies including the cash marketing control 
strategy. The risk, as measured by the standard deviation of returns, fell 
slightly below the midpoint of the range delimited by the standard devia­
tions observed in cash marketing and routine hedging. The relative results 
for the two periods indicate that during 1973 and 1974, multiple hedging 
would have required a producer to forego a portion of the higher prices, 
but by a much smaller amount than that observed in the other hedging strategies. 
The most consistent result was that the multiple hedging strategies reduced 
losses in futures positions in years that prices rose (but typically did not 
increase futures markets profits in years of declining prices).
Technical analysis did not, however, provide a means for extracting 
profits from intra-year changes in futures prices consistently. In fact, 
when totaled over the nine year test period, futures market profits were 
negative for both multiple hedging strategies. A producer who uses trend­
following devices with the sole objective of reaping speculative profits 
from corn futures is apt to be disappointed. Nonetheless, average price was 
improved relative to routine hedging while risk was reduced relative to 
not hedging.
Thus, our analyses cannot be summarized in a single, simple conclusion.
It seems likely that no single "golden decision rule" is available from 
technical analysis. One can find profitable rules for particular historical 
periods, but such a rule, say based on 3/10 day averages, will not necessarily 
be profitable in an individual future year. In other words, a rule that 
was profitable in 1982 may not be profitable in 1983. Our analysis does
Multiple hedging— a1 summary
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suggests however , that if the same rule is applied consistently over a 
period of years, the variance of income will be reduced_relative to not 
hedging and perhaps average incomes can be raised relative to routinely
hedging.
The benefits (and disadvantages) of any hedging program are realized 
over a period of years. A routine hedge, if followed rigorously, will ten 
to provide net returns above cash prices when price levels are low and con­
versely provide returns below cash prices when price levels are high. A 
target price-type selective hedge can provide the farmer with the target 
in some years, but in other years it may be impossible to achieve the tar 
get. Moreover, even if the target is achieved, higher returns may have 
been foregone as the result of the hedge.
Likewise, multiple hedging can help avoid large margin calls m  years 
when prices trend upward. But, at the beginning of the year, say at planting 
time, the hedger cannot antitipate actual price behavior, and the multip 
hedging strategy can result in significant speculative losses. No program 
is likely to provide consistent gains every year. Hence, as suggested above, 
the hedging program must be judged by its performance over a period of years. 
This may provide little consolation to the hedger who experiences large 
losses from his futures positions during a particular year.
Other considerations in hedging
A grower considering a hedging program should establish an objective 
for the program, and the program should be carried out in light o ayai 
able information. With respect to objectives, does the^grower wish^to 
reduce the variance of income over a period of years while maintaining 
(approximately) the average market price? Or, does the grower wish to ob 
tain prices that are high relative to production costs in those usual y 
rare, instances when such prices are available m  the market. Or, is the 
grower primarily interested in speculation?
The hedger needs to be familiar with the economic climate— fundamentals-
even if he is relying on technical analysis. Price objectives will be 
established in light of market prices, production costs, and government 
loan rates. If current prices are near support levels and assuming farmers 
are participating in the support program, then little downside price ris
exists, and it makes little sense to place a selling hedge. Prices might 
rise, but a limit exists on any possible decline. In contrast, if prices 
are well above support levels, the risk of either a price increase or de­
crease exists, and hedging strategies should be considered.
After the grower has established an objective for a hedge program, then
he or she will want to discuss it with a broker and credit agency. The 
hedger must have adequate credit to meet margin calls and to see the hedge 
program through to completion. The hedger also needs to have confidence 
that the broker will work to achieve the hedger s objective. Brokers of 
work with speculative accounts and in some instances may be less familia 
with farmer-hedger accounts than with purely speculative traders.
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Finally, a hedging program should be judged relative to its objectives 
and not relative to some especially high prices, which could have been ob­
tained with 20/20 hindsight. The use of moving averages, for example, can 
provide the benefit of reducing margin calls, and hence hedging costs, 
relative to a routine hedging program. Hedging programs also reduce the 
variability of income, but it is doubtful that they can consistently pro­
vide higher than average incomes.
APPENDIX
Five hedging strategies are evaluated in this report; each was simu­
lated for the 1972-1980 crop years resulting in nine observations of each 
strategy. An attempt was made to choose strategies that are directly com­
parable to not only the control strategies, but to each other as well.
Each strategy has decision criteria that differs in only one aspect from 
that used in at least one other strategy, and the results are therefore 
comparable. In addition, strategies have been' selected that are:
Definitions of Hedging Strategies
( 1 )  a p p l ic a b le  t o  th e  c o rn  f o r  g r a in  p ro d u c e r ;
(2 )  e a s i l y  im p le m e n te d  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c e r s ;
( 3 )  h a v e  in d i c a t e d  p o t e n t i a l  i n  p r e v io u s  r e s e a r c h .
In all strategies "placing a hedge" involves selling December corn futures
c o n t r a c t s  t r a d e d  on  th e  C h ic a g o  B o a rd  o f  T ra d e .
Unhedged Production. This strategy calls for routinely selling corn 
at harvest in the local cash market on November 15th of each year.
Routine Hedge. This program involves routinely placing a short hedge 
at planting and lifting the hedge at harvest to coincide with the cash 
sale of grain in local markets. May 1st of each year is selected as 
representative hedging date. The first two alternatives act as controls 
in the experimental design and serve as the primary reference points 
evaluating performance of the other strategies.
Target Price (Selective hedge I). A short hedge is placed if the 
localized futures price (current price of the December contract minus ex
pected local basis at harvest) equals or exceeds a producer s break-even 
price plus a $.10 per bushel return. Futures prices are monitored from 
Say 1 on, and the hedge, once placed, is left in effect until harvesttime 
sale of corn. This strategy attempts to use the futures market to
a fa v o r a b le  p r i c e .  The  p r i c e  a t  w h ic h  th e  f u t u r e s  c o n t r a c t s  a re  s o ld ,  
th e  b a s is ,  becom es th e  p ro d u c e rs *  p r i c e  o b je c t iv e .
The two remaining strategies depend on technical analysis of futures 
prices. Although a wide variety of technical systems have appeal as 
trend following devices, moving average systems are selected as the tech 
nique used for the following reasons. 1
(1) Moving averages give precise buy and sell^signals 
subjectivity in the simulated hedging decisions.
e l im in a t i n g
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(2) Moving averages are easily calculateds updated and graphed and 
therefore meet the objective of being easily used by individual 
producers.
(3) Moving averages have shown relatively good performance in 
identifying significant turning points in market prices.
(4) Weaver's results suggest that moving averages outperform point 
and figure analysis when used as a trend following device.
These two multiple hedging strategies are purely technical strategies. 
They call for placing and lifting short hedges throughout the growing season 
based on signals given by a moving average system.
Selective Strategy II. This strategy calls for selling futures if the 
3 day moving average crosses the 10 day moving average from above. The 
futures position is maintained until the 3 day average crosses the 10 day 
average from below, signaling an upward trend in prices. At this time, the 
futures contracts are bought back and an unhedged position is maintained 
until the next sell signal is given at which time the hedge is replaced. 
Futures prices are monitored from the beginning of the planting season. Any 
open futures positions are closed at harvest to correspond with the sale of 
corn in the cash market.
Selective Strategy III is identical to the 3/10 day strategy with the 
exception that a 10/40 day moving average system is used to generate buy and 
sell signals.
Test Period and Sources of Price Data
The simulation of the hedging strategies requires a continuous series 
of daily opening and closing prices for the December corn futures contract. 
This contract represents the first delivery month of the new crop year and 
is the delivery option nearest to harvest. The daily futures price series 
allows for testing of the selective hedging strategies decision criteria 
as outlined above. The series also allows for calculation of the effects 
of price changes on a producer's margin requirements while hedges are in 
place. This leads to improved estimates of hedging costs, as the cost of 
funds needed to meet margin requirements must be considered as part of the 
costs of hedging. The futures price series used in the study were obtained 
from the Chicago Board of Trade for each December delivery corn contract 
traded between January 1972 and the expiration of the December 1980 contract.
The hedging simulations also require a series of harvesttime cash 
prices for the nine years included in the study. In this study, "harvest­
time" is denoted as the month of November in each year. This led to ob­
taining cash prices from an individual grain elevator in western New York 
State for the month of November. The use of actual prices, rather than a 
regional average, allows corn marketings to be simulated at prices that 
were available to individual producers.
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Assumptions for futures trading mechanics
Our analysis attempts to parallel reality as close as possible, but a 
number of simplifying assumptions were necessary in order to keep the simula­
tions tractable. The following assumptions pertain to the mechanics of 
futures trading as carried out in the simulations.
(1) The midpoint of the daily closing-price range is used as the repre­
sentative futures price for generating trade signals.
(2) All hedges are placed and liquidated at the midpoint of the opening 
price range on the day following a trade signal. This assumption 
recognizes that an individual placing a market order does not know 
beforehand the price at which the futures transaction will be 
made,
(3) Trades are prohibited on days that corn futures prices open^limit 
up or down. Hedge placement or liquidation is deferred until the 
futures market opens at less than a limit price move.
(4) No futures market transactions can occur before the assumed 
hedging date of May 1st in each year of the test period.
(5) Any open futures positions are closed on the assumed harvest date 
of November 15th to correspond with the sale of corn in the cash 
market.
Simulation of the hedging strategies requires discrete starting and 
stopping points between which the decision criterion is evaluated. In prac­
tice, a producer becomes subject to price risk as soon as resources are com­
mitted to the production of corn. This can occur quite early in the year. 
However, the producer is also subject to production risk. Estimates^of final 
yield will improve as the planting and growing season progresses. Using May 
1st as the starting date assumes that planting intentions are fully formu­
lated and that some assessment of springtime planting conditions can be made.
For each strategy simulated, all corn is marketed at the^cash price 
posted on November 15th of each year. Using the same cash price for each 
strategy in any given year allows comparision of hedging performance to focus 
on how returns from the futures market differed among strategies.
Assumptions for Simulation of Hedging Strategies
A d d i t i o n a l  a s s u m p tio n s  f o r  s im u la t io n  o f  t h e h e d g in g  s t r a t e g ie s
A second group of assumptions is related to factors that may be unique 
to individual farmers, but are necessary to perform the simulations. These 
include:
(1) The CBOT corn contract calls for delivery of 5000 bushels of Mo. 2 
yellow corn. In the simulations it is assumed that the producer is marketing 
a deliverable grade corn. Thus, quality discount schedules were not con­
sidered when obtaining the cash prices.
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(2) Yield variability and lumpiness of contract size are two factors 
that influence the proportion of production that would be hedged. A farmer 
harvesting 300 acres at an average yield of 85 bushels per acre has 25,500 
bushels of corn. In this example, an "equal and opposite" position in 
futures would require the sale of five futures contracts. However, at the 
beginning of the growing season, final output is not known. If production 
is overhedged by selling more futures contracts than the amount of grain 
harvested, the excess futures position is best characterized as price specu­
lation rather than hedging. Conversely, underhedging results in a portion 
of the cash grain position remaining exposed to price risk. For the pur­
poses of this study, the trading of one 5000 bushel contract is simulated 
and the average returns are reported on a per bushel basis. The effect is 
to simulate a 100% hedged position,
(3) Commission Costs. A producer would use a broker as an inter­
mediary in conducting futures market transactions and is subject to a com­
mission charge on each round-turn (sale and purchase) trade of one contract.
An assumed rate of $50.00 per contract or $.01 per bushel is charged in 
each year of the test period. The multiple hedging strategies permit more 
than one round-turn trade within a production period. Each trade increases 
hedging costs by $ .0 1 per bushel,
(4) Margin Deposits. A producer is required to deposit margin money 
with his broker for each futures contract traded. The margin acts as a 
performance bond. Margin requirements consist of the initial margin de­
posited when a futures position is taken and a maintenance margin level below 
which the futures account may not fall. A rise in futures prices (in the 
case of a short hedge) can lead to margin calls that require additional 
funds to restore the futures account to the original margin level. The 
opportunity cost of margin funds increases hedging costs and decreases the 
net returns received from a hedging program.
In order to estimate the costs associated with margin deposits, a pro­
ducer is assumed to borrow sufficient funds to keep the futures position fully 
margined. The interest charged on these loans is then used as a proxy for 
estimating the opportunity cost. Implicit in this assumption is that by 
maintaining a hedged position (and hence decreasing price risk) a producerTs 
line of credit is increased at least by an amount sufficient to cover all 
loans for hedging activities.
Once a producer deposits margin money and a loan balance is established, 
interest on the loan is charged over the life of the hedge. Rising futures 
prices, resulting in margin calls, lead to an increased loan balance while 
decreasing prices can result in profits accruing to the futures position.
These profits can be withdrawn and used to reduce the outstanding loan 
balance. Thus, the funds borrowed to meet margin requirements are not 
static, but instead fluctuate over the production period. In the simula­
tions, this loan balance is charged interest on a daily basis. Interest 
costs are accumulated and added to the commission costs to provide an esti­
mate of total hedging costs. The annual loan rate to borrowers averaged for 
all Production Credit Associations in the Springfield Massachusetts district 
of the Farm Credit Banks was used as the interest rate charged on funds bor­
rowed to meet margin requirements (Appendix Table 1).
39
Appendix Table 1. Interest Rates Used in the Hedging Simulations to
Estimate Cost of Margin Money, 1972-1980
Y e a r
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
P e r c e n t  p e r  annum  
6.92 
7.62 
8.88 
8.85 
8.05 
7.75 
8.37 
10.36 
11.97
S o u rc e : Farm  C r e d i t  Banks o f  S p r in g f i e l d .
Minimum margin requirements for corn futures are established by the 
CBOT and are changed according to Exchange's perception of price volatility 
and the level of risk. However, brokerage firms often require that their 
customers deposit more than the, Exchange minimum. It is assumed that a
broker require 200% of the Exchange minimum as the initial margin require-
ULU aqqirmed to be 75% of this initial marginment. The maintenance margin is assumed 10 ue
level (Appendix Table 2).
rsl Cost of Production. The decision criterion for selective hedge I
is based chilling futures only if the localized :futures
exceeds a producer's target price. The target price is calculated from an 
estimated cost of production plus a specified margin.
Production costs will vary for each individual depending on harvested
acreage cropping practices, machinery complement and the method used m
“ delating landScharges. This study estimates P ^ - ^ V o T l L s t / a t H h ;  what ad hoc way, but the resulting estimates are adequate to illustrate th
different hedging strategies.
The cost of production estimates used in the simulations are based^on 
cost data collected by Cornell researchers in each year of the test Perl°“ 
(Farm Cost Accounts). These costs, collected primarily from producers with
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Appendix Table 2. Initial Margin Requirement for Corn Futures Contracts 
Used in Hedging Simulations, 1972-1980
Year Margins^
1972 $600
9-20-72-^ 800
1973 800
5-29-73 1000
5-30-73 1500
6-4-73 2000
10-18-73 1500
1974 1000
7-19-74 2000
1975 1000
1976 1000
1977 1000
10-20-77 800
1978 1000
1979 1000
1980 1000
aj Initial margin requirements represent 200% of the CBOT hedging minimums
b/ Only changes in margin requirements that occurred within the growing 
season are given.
Source: Chicago Board of Trade.
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relatively small harvested acreage, were adjusted downward t o “ ^ W e s t e r n  
economies available to the larger cash grain producers operating m  Western 
New York. The size economy adjustment was based on a 1980 survey of produ 
tion costs incurred by relatively larger producers of corn for grain (Snyder, 
1981). The specific technique used for calculating cost o pro uc 
estimates was as follows: (a) The observed ratios of growing and harves g
costs between the 1980 survey of field corn producers and th“
Accounts were used as the adjustment factors. (b) The 8ro^ " S  and ha 
vesting costs per acre published in the Farm Cost Accounts for 1972 1979
a a  a i - o r i  h v  t-hpse factors (c) The drying and hauling cost com- were then adjusted by these factors. fc; iuc y & p . Paid
ponents observed in the 1980 survey were then adju.3t!L Tq^!1979 period! 
Index (USDA Ag. Prices) to estimate these costs for the 197 prpPHlvided 
(d) Finally, the estimated total costs of production per acre w 
S ’the”  county Western New York average yield to obtain an e|. ima e of th<s 
production costs on a per bushel basis. The production cost estimates ar 
presented in Appendix Table 3.
Appendix Table 3. Estimated Corn Production Costs, Western New York
1972-1980
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
_______Costs_____
dollars per bushel
1 .54— ^
1.57
1.86
2.02
2.19
2.14
2.48
2.68
2.58
a/ Production costs estimated by adjusting costs published in Farm Cost 
Accounts, 1972-1980.
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The second component of the target price is the specification of a 
profit margin, and a $ . 1 0 per bushel profit objective was used in each 
year of the test period. In practice, an individual would formulate his 
own objective.
Bas is Calculat ions
A general definition of the term "basis" is the difference between the 
price of a futures contract and the cash price of a commodity (Tomek, 1978). 
Specific usage of the term depends on time and location considerations that 
determine which futures contract and cash price is used. (Also, in calcula­
ting the basis, the trade tends to subtract futures from cash while re­
searchers often do the opposite.) For the producer-hedger, the relevant 
futures contract is often the delivery option nearest his marketing period, 
and the relevant cash price is the current price available in his local 
marketing area. Therefore, the term basis as used in this study is specifi­
cally defined as the difference between the December corn futures contract 
and the harvesttime cash price available in Western New York.
A perfect forecast of the harvesttime basis allows a producer to use 
futures markets to establish a precise price prior to harvest. This is 
illustrated by a simplified example:
On July 1st the December corn contract is trading at $2.96 per 
bushel. A producer, expecting the harvesttime basis to be $.18, 
calculates a localized futures price of $2.78 per bushel (cur­
rent futures price minus expected basis: $2.96 - $.18 = $2.78).
If $2.78 is an attractive price, the producer sells futures con­
tracts against his cash crop. By November 15th the futures price 
declines to $2.50 and, as expected, the local cash price is $»18 
under the futures price or $2.32. The producer sells corn at 
$2,32 and buys back the futures contracts at $2.50.
The returns from the futures position of $.46 per bushel when added to the 
$2.32 received from the cash sale would result in a price before deducting 
hedging costs of $2.78 - exactly equal to the producer’s price objective.
In reality, however, it is not possible to forecast exactly the har­
vesttime basis. Hence, the convention of using quotation marks when stating 
that futures markets can be used to "lock—in" a price for a growing crop is 
used here. The magnitude of the deviation of the actual basis from the ex­
pected basis will determine how close the actual price realized is to the 
price objective.
For this study, the basis calculations represent the futures-cash price 
relationship observed at a Western New York location. In calculating the 
basis, the harvesttime period was defined as the month of November in each 
year. Summary statistics for the November basis are presented in Appendix 
Table 4.
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Appendix Table 4. Calculated November Corn Basis * Western New York
Location, 1972-1980
Year Low High Median
, b /Expected Basis—
per bushel —
1972 -.02^ .08 .02 . 1 2
1973 - . 0 1 . 27 .08 . 10
1974 .26 .59 .43 .09
1975 .45 .67 .50 .18
1976 . 10 .29 .22 .34
1977 .15 .51 .31 .38
1978 .20 .22 . 2 1 .34
1979 . 1 1 . 2 1 .15 .25
1980 .56 .82 .69 .22
a/ A negative sign indicates that the cash price exceeded the futures price.
b/ Expected basis calculated as the average of three previous years1 median 
November basis.
Sources: Futures Prices: Midpoint of daily closing price range, December
corn contract, Chicago Board of Trade.
Cash Prices: Daily posted prices supplied by an individual
grain elevator.
The variability of the observed basis within and among years during 
the test period indicate that the Western New York basis is characterized 
by instability. Visual examination of Table 4 yields no readily apparent 
trends in harvesttime basis behavior. This instability translates into 
increased basis risk for the producer following a hedging strategy that 
attempts to "lock-in" a price for his growing crop.
The expected basis shown in Appendix Table 4 is the average of the 
median basis for the prior three years. As explained in the body of our 
report and as is clear from the table, the average is a rather poor estimate 
of the basis that actually prevails in a particular year. A more conserva­
tive approach, which is reported in the text, is to use the average of the
high basis.
44
References
Curley, Anthony J. and Robert M. Bear. Investment Analysis and Management. 
New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1979.
Farm Credit Banks of Springfield. Annual Report. 1976, 1979 and 1980.
Jiler, Henry, ed. Guide to Commodity Price Forecasting. New York:
Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1965.
Kaufman, P. J. Commodity Trading Systems and Methods. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1978.
_______ _____• Technical Analysis in Commodities. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1980.
Kluis, Alan, Leroy Louwagie and Loren Kruse. Successful F a rm ing Charting 
for Profits. Meridith Corporation, 1981.
New York Department of Agriculture and Markets. Division of Market De­
velopment . Grain and Dry Bean Market Newsletter. Rochester, NY, 
selected issues, 1978-1980.
Querin, Scott F. "Hedging Strategies Utilizing Technical Analysis: An
Application to Corn in Western New York." M.S. Thesis, Cornell 
University, 1982.
Riggins, Steven K. "Corn Marketing in Western New York." Ph.D. Thesis, 
Cornell University, 1978.
Snyder, Darwin P. "Field Crops Costs and Returns from Farm Cost Accounts." 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, A.E. Res,, 
annual issues, 1972-1980.
_____________. "The Competitive Position of Processing Sweet Corn Produc­
tion in New York State." Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell 
University A.E. Res. 81-1, January 1981.
Tomek, William G. "Hedging in Commodity Futures: A Guide for Farmers in
the Northeast." College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Cornell 
University, Information Bulletin 147, 1978.
U. S. Department of Agriculture. Crop Reporting Board. Agricultural Prices, 
Annual Summary, 1980.
Weaver, Jack Robert. "The Application of Technical Analysis to Grain 
Markets." MS Thesis, Michigan State University, 1980.
